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I.

Introduction
The use of sexual devices has been a source of contention in the United States for nearly

a century. Religious fundamentalists believe that the use of such devices is morally
reprehensible. A significant part of the county subscribes to traditional Christian ideals that
promote sex between a man and a woman for the purpose of procreation, any manipulation is
often met with resistance. Before Lawrence, and a couple other relevant landmark cases, it was
much easier for this group to impose its will on the general public through anti-obscenity
statutes. After Lawrence, I argue that a right to sexual privacy was established that substantially
limited a legislature's ability to encroach on an individual's bedroom behavior. Lawrence is to be
interpreted as the law may not criminalize sexual behavior of any individual in the privacy of his
home. Thus, the right to sexual privacy must extend to one's use of sex toys. Nevertheless, in
light of Lawrence, a few states have still enacted anti-obscenity statutes that infringe on one's
right to use sex toys. While it is hard to imagine a statute standing up to constitutional scrutiny
involving the private use of sex toys, the outcome is far less clear regarding laws prohibiting the
sale of sex toys. In order to uphold such statutes, states have set forth several arguments
regarding the sale of these devices. In these instances, states argue that the statutes should be
upheld based on a public morality position. Essentially, a government determines that certain
values should be preserved through laws that can limit what is perceived to be generally
unacceptable behavior. More effective though has been an argument grounded on the “secondary
effects doctrine” that has allowed states to effectively ban the sale of sex toys through zoning
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laws. Under this rationale, a government may contend that the operation of certain businesses
can lead to an offshoot of negative effects that harm the surrounding areas. Thus, it is asserted
that the government has a legitimate interest in combating these effects through legislation. My
paper will first examine Lawrence to argue that it established a right to sexual privacy that
encompasses the use of sex toys. In doing so, I will examine the split between the 5th Circuit and
the 11th Circuit. Additionally, I will address the public morality argument in favor of antiobscenity statute, pointing out its failures. Lastly, the paper aims to highlight how states do not
need to explicitly ban the sale of sex toys because the secondary effects doctrine and zoning laws
accomplish the same goal.

II.

Lawrence as a Starting Point.

Any discussion of anti-obscenity statutes and their relation to the use and sale of sex toys
starts with an analysis of Lawrence.1 The case involved a state statute that effectively prohibited
sexual conduct between homosexual men by criminalizing certain sexual conduct between two
individuals of the same sex.2 Two men were charged with violating the statute.3 They challenged
the constitutionality of the statute and lost at the state and appellate level.4 The Supreme Court
eventually overturned the appellate division.5
The opinion in Lawrence enumerated a few key points that support the idea that one
possesses a right to sexual privacy. The court concluded that engaging in same sex intercourse is
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an exercise of a personal liberty guaranteed by the constitution.6 Additionally, the court stated
that moral disapproval cannot be viewed as a legitimate state interest for rational basis purposes.7
The court held that the statue unfairly attacks same sex couples.8 One must assume that same sex
male couples engage in some form of sexual intercourse that is deemed sodomy under the
statute. Furthermore, the court held that the presumption of criminal behavior of all same sex
couples greatly ostracizes them.9

A. An Intermediate Level of Review.

To make any sense of this issue, it is imperative to understand the standard of review
employed by the court in Lawrence to establish a right to sexual privacy. Previously, courts either
applied strict scrutiny or a rational basis review to address challenged state statutes. Strict
scrutiny requires that the law be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 10
Under this high level of review, the usual presumption of constitutionally is lost and the
government is provided little leeway to construct a statute that reaches beyond its stated
purpose.11 Conversely, a rationale basis review requires that the challenging party prove that the
stated government interest is not rationally related to the relevant law.12 In this case, there is a
high presumption of constitutionality and provides governments with incredible flexibility. 13
Finding these two standards difficult to work with in certain contexts, the Supreme Court
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developed a third standard of review that falls somewhere in between the two aforementioned
standards.
Often referred to as intermediate scrutiny, the standard requires that the law exhibit a
substantial relation to an important government interest.14 In one of the clearest expressions of
this hybrid test, the court in Craig v. Boren invalidated a statute that prohibited the sale of beer
with a certain level of alcohol content to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of
18.15 The government interest to be furthered by the law was public protection on the roadways
as the government believed that statistics showed males were more likely to cause traffic
accidents associated with alcohol use.16 In analyzing the constitutionality of the law, the court
merely stated that classifications that distinguish males and females are subject to “scrutiny,”
without committing to strict scrutiny.17 The court then explained this modified standard citing
precedent and stated that, “classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”18 A version of
the intermediate scrutiny standard was applied in Lawrence as well.
Whereas the court Boren was far more deliberate in its articulation of a hybrid level of
scrutiny, the standard of review used by the Lawrence court is far more unclear. The court held
that the challenged statute, “furthered no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion
into the personal and private life of an individual.”19 Immediately preceding this statement
though, the court went on to provide a list of conduct that the court seems to imply would justify
an intrusion of personal liberty.20 Thus, the court did not necessarily deem such an intrusion
14
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completely off-limits. Instead the court attacked the importance of the state interest in relation to
the significance of the government’s intrusion. By using an intermediate scrutiny standard, the
court utilized a balancing approach that weighed the reasonableness of the state interests against
the individual right that is sought to be protected. As a result, the court established a right to
sexual privacy that does not require the strict scrutiny standard of review that attaches to matters
of enumerated, fundamental rights.

B. How Lawrence Carves Out a Right to Sexual Privacy.

Whether done purposefully or not, the court is quite vague on the extent that its opinion
should extend to other issues pertaining to sexual behavior. As a result, litigators either argue for
a broad or narrow interpretation of the opinion depending upon their vantage point.21 Under a
narrow view, the argument follows that Lawrence addressed a limited factual scenario that
involved same-sexual sexual intercourse.22 Proponents of this view contend that had Lawrence
meant to encompass a larger right, the court would have employed a Glucksberg analysis.23 The
analysis used in Glucksberg to identify a right or liberty that falls within the protection of
substantive due process requires a court to consider two factors; (1) whether the alleged right is
deeply rooted in the tradition and history of the nation, and (2) a careful description of the
asserted fundamental right.24 In Glucksberg, the court narrowly defined the asserted right as one
allowing an individual to assist another in committing suicide, differentiating it from what some
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Laura M. Clark, Comment, Should Texas’s Former Ban on Obscene-Device Promotion Pass Constitutional Muster
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asserted was a "right to die.25 The court noted a history of statutes banning assisted suicides and
concluded that, as a result, there is not a fundamental right to assist someone who wishes to kill
himself.26 The Glucksberg court set forth a clear test for evaluating whether the issue is one
regarding a fundamental right, and in the absence of such analysis, it can be argued that clearly
the court is not dealing with a fundamental right. The result is that the statute needs only to be
rationally related to the state interest.27
Conversely, a broad interpretation of the statute proposes that the opinion has furtherreaching implications. Proponents of this view contend that the court established a right to sexual
privacy that largely protects an individual’s actions within the confines of his bedroom.28 Under
this view, the interpretation of the statute is not whether two men possess a fundamental right to
engage in sexual intercourse with each other but instead whether two individuals are free to
behave as they please in the privacy of their bedroom. I argue that the latter interpretation is
correct and that one is afforded the right to use sex toys in private.
In its rejection of the Texas statute prohibiting sodomy, the court focused specifically on the
idea of liberty. The court viewed an impediment to one’s right to engage in private, intimate
behavior as an infringement on that individual’s personal liberty.29 The court concluded that
Texas had not communicated a legitimate state interest that warranted limiting one’s liberty in
the proposed capacity.30 The court noted that the state’s insistence that it had an obligation to
uphold a certain level of public morality failed on several levels. For one, there was a growing
sentiment in the United States that citizens should be afforded a significant level of privacy
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concerning bedroom behavior.31 Additionally, the argument that a right to sexual privacy was
created is embedded in the majority’s discussion as to the behavior at stake. The court rejected
the notion that the liberty at issue was simply the right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy in
the privacy of their bedrooms.32 While the fact pattern concerned simply that, the contended right
was something more. Justice Kennedy argued that the relevant right at issue was one’s ability to
engage in private sexual conduct without the government intrusion.33 In doing so, the majority
quickly dismissed any notion that there is a clear line of history and tradition that bans such
conduct.
Past cases have furthered the notion that individuals have a right to be left alone within the
confines of their bedrooms. In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held a Georgia statute to be
unconstitutional that made it illegal to possess obscene materials.34 Acting on a search warrant,
police arrived at a Georgia man’s home and confiscated film that they deemed to be obscene.35
The man was then convicted under the statute.36 In its opinion, the court stated that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments made it constitutionally impermissible to make illegal possession of
obscene materials.37 The court succinctly concluded that the Constitution protects ones right to
possess information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and that government action
contrary to that ideal was an unwarranted intrusion of an individual’s privacy.38
A second case, while a state Supreme Court decision, reinforced the notion of privacy rights
and was followed by a series of decisions in other jurisdictions in accordance with this rationale.
In Commonwealth v. Wasson, the Court struck down a statute that made consensual sodomy
31
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between homosexual partners illegal.39 In an undercover operation initiated by state police,
undercover agents solicited sex from men, including Jeffery Wasson.40 Eventually, investigators
were able to get Mr. Wasson to incriminate himself after he suggested engaging in certain sexual
acts that violated the Kentucky sodomy statute.41 He challenged his eventual conviction on the
grounds that it was unconstitutional because the law violated his privacy rights.42 In invalidating
the statute, the Court noted that the state had a history or discouraging government intrusion in
similar attacks on privacy rights. 43 The decision in Lawrence, coupled with previous federal and
state court precedent makes it clear that the government has no place in our bedrooms.

C. The Right to Privacy Extends to the Use of Sex Toys.

While the court declined to consider how its decision affects future sexual conduct issues, it
did carve out a right to engage in private and intimate behavior. Furthermore, the court made it
clear that such a right cannot be infringed upon on the basis of public morality. An individual
who uses a device for sexual stimulation in private is equally expressing the liberty the court
protected in Lawrence. The similarities make any other conclusion irrational. Both forms of
sexual behavior are performed in private. Additionally, the two examples are of acts that fall
outside of the traditional view of sexual intercourse for the purpose of procreation. Moreover,
neither private homosexual conduct, nor private sex toy use harms third parties. Lastly, there is
no aspect of sex toy use that makes it nonconsensual. Thus, it clearly cannot be stated that private
possession and use of sex toys falls outside of the scope of sexual privacy established in
39
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Lawrence. As a result, the primary manner to ban the use of sex toys is to block their sale.
Accordingly, the relevant discussion turns to whether anti-obscenity statutes that prohibit the sale
of sex toys should be constitutionally invalidated after Lawrence.

II.

Legislators Get Creative to Block the Use of Sex Toys.

In accordance with the rationale mentioned above, no state possesses legislation that bans
the possession or use of sex toys in private.44 Additionally, only three states enacted a law that
limits the sale of these devices.45 Consequently, it is clear that the discussion is squarely centers
on whether a state may constitutionally create such a barrier to a sex toy.
In all three cases, the sale of sex toys is banned under state anti-obscenity statutes.
Alabama46, Mississippi47 and Virginia48 have all established devices used for sexual
enhancement as obscene. The obvious result is that it makes the use of such devices nearly

44

William Charles Hayes, Rabbit Hunting in the Supreme Court: The Constitutionality of State Prohibitions of Sex
Toy Sales Following Lawrence v. Texas, 44 GA. L. REV. 245, 252 (2009).
45
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CODE OF ALA. § 13A-12-200.2 (2010) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or
agree to distribute any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. Material not otherwise obscene may
be obscene under this section if the distribution of the material, the offer to do so, or the possession with the
intent to do so is a commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of prurient appeal.
47
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2010) states:
A person commits the offense of distributing unlawful sexual devices when he knowingly sells, advertises,
publishes or exhibits to any person any three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses such devices with the intent to
do so. A person commits the offense of wholesale distributing unlawful sexual devices when he distributes
for the purpose of resale any three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses such devices with the intent to do so.
48
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374 (2010) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to (1) Prepare any obscene item for the purposes of sale or
distribution; or (2) Print, copy, manufacture, produce, or reproduce any obscene item for purposes of sale or
distribution; or (3) Publish, sell, rent, lend, transport in intrastate commerce, or distribute or exhibit any
obscene item, or offer to do any of these things; or (4) Have in his possession with intent to sell, rent, lend,
transport, or distribute any obscene item. Possession in public or in a public place of any obscene item as
defined in this article shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a violation of this section.
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impossible without actually making it illegal to possess sex toys. In the context of Lawrence, the
issue is whether barring the sale of sex toys infringes upon one’s liberty without satisfying the
requirement of meeting a legitimate state interest. Two recent cases in the United State Court of
Appeals have considered the constitutionality of this legislation and have come to conflicting
conclusions.

A. A Battle of Interpretation: The 5th Circuit v. The 11th Circuit.

The split between the 5th and 11th Circuit Court of Appeals marks two different
interpretations of the Lawrence decision and its application to anti-obscenity statutes that block
the sale of sex toys. Moreover, the split highlights the likelihood that Lawrence will be applied
inconsistently because of its vague language. Since only a handful of states possess statutes
relevant to this discussion, and very few courts have addressed their constitutionality, it is
imperative to consider these two cases before moving forward.
In 2008, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals considered the sale of sex toys in Reliable
Consultants, Inc v. Earle. Addresses a Texas statute that makes it a crime to promote or sell sex
toys.49 The statute in this case banned public and commercial things, unlike the private, noncommercial aspect of Lawrence.50 The court found that the right to engage in private intimate
conduct outweighed a public morality argument.51 It should be noted that one provision of the
statute made it illegal to lend a sexual device to another person.52 Justice Reavley found that

49

Reliable Consultants, Inc v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 741.
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Lawrence had indeed established that a right to sexual privacy exists.53 He further found that the
use of sex toys falls within the scope of a right to sexual privacy.54 Therefore, it was his position
that it is now the job of the courts to simply uphold this right.55 The argument for upholding the
ban on sex toys was a public morality argument, and Justice Reavley felt that justification was
not enough to permit the government to infringe to one’s right to sexual privacy.56 Justice
Reavley appears to acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Lawrence does not use strict scrutiny
or rational basis analysis, but instead some sort of hybrid.
Conversely a case before the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals yielded a different opinion on
a related matter. In Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., Alabama's Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act
was challenged as a violation of due process.57 The law prohibited the sale of sex toys in the
state.58 In the case, the idea of a fundamental right to sexual privacy was explored. It also
addressed Lawrence and the subsequent reach of privacy protections. Justice Birch upheld the
ban on the sale of sex toys based on a few justifications. First, Justice Birch argued that
Lawrence did not create a fundamental right to sexual privacy.59 Had a fundamental right been
created, Justice Birch argued that a Glucksberg analysis would have had to occurred (was the
right deeply rooted in the nation’s history and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty).60 Birch
limited the right (sale of sex toys) and clearly found it failed the Glucksberg test, thus a
fundamental right had not been established.61 Without a fundamental right of sexual privacy,

53
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Justice Birch concluded that the rational basis test must have been used in Lawrence.62 He then
stated that the facts in this case are distinguishable from Lawrence, thus even if public morality
was removed as a justification, the Lawrence decision did not apply in this case because this case
involved something beyond the “private, consensual and non-commercial “ conduct in
Lawrence.63 The ban here involves public and commercial things.

III.

The Government Believes Banning Sex Toys is Necessary to Protect the Moral Fiber

of Its People

A common justification for prohibiting the sale of sex toys is founded on the notion of
public morality. Laws based on a public morality argument generally involve conduct that cuts
against the values society wishes to maintain. 64 Included under the umbrella of laws of public
morality are laws against polygamy, incest, public nudity, and in some states, laws against the
sale of sex toys. After Lawrence, it is clear that public morality cannot be used as valid
justification to uphold statutes that ban sexual behavior.
The attorneys representing both Alabama and Texas in the recent sex toy cases made the
argument that Lawrence still permitted states to enact legislation for the purpose of protected
public morality. In Williams, the Alabama Attorney General (“Alabama AG”) argued that
Lawrence did not extend to commercial regulation of obscene products.65 In doing so, counsel

62
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Christopher Wolfe, Forum on Public Morality: Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J.
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likened the ban on the sale of sex toys to a ban on prostitution.66 The Alabama AG argued, “this
court has long upheld restrictions on the commercial trafficking of obscenity not withstanding its
recognition of the right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of one’s home.”67 This
proposition of course hinges on the argument that stopping the sale of sex toys somehow is not
an invasion of one’s private sexual choice. The Texas Attorney General (“Texas AG”) reiterated
many of the same claims mentioned above. Like the Alabama AG, the Texas AG shaped the issue
as one regarding the sale of sex.68 The Consequently, the Texas AG also argued that allowing the
sale of sex toys opens the door to invalidated similar public morals legislation like laws against
prostitution.69 The argument again denied that the statute effectively prohibited one’s ability to
use sex toys referring to the fact that the statute did not contain language of the sort.70 While
public morality may be rationally related to certain public state interests, the right at stake with
sex toy issues is one of a private matter. Both the Alabama AG and Texas AG mischaracterized
the issue.
To understand why the sale of sex toys is protected by Lawrence, it is important to clarify
the specific right that the relevant anti-obscenity statutes infringe upon. Barring the sale of sex
toys produces the obvious result that individuals cannot purchase sex toys. Without the ability to
purchase sex toys, that individual has been prohibited from engaging in private sexual conduct.
The sale of sex toys does not result in the use of sex toys in public. The sale of sex toys is
different from the sale of sex (i.e. prostitution) because sex toys involve either personal use, or

66
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use with a consenting partner. Consequently, sex toys involve private, intimate sexual conduct
that is protected under Lawrence against public morality justifications.
Whereas certain aspects of Lawrence appear vague, what is clear is that a government
may not infringe upon one’s right to private sexual conduct on public morality grounds. The
court in Lawrence was clear when it stated:

“In his dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens concluded that
the fact a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
a law prohibiting the practice, and individual decisions concerning
the intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to
produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process.
That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls here.71
Again, one’s use of sex toys is private sexual conduct, and while they may be morally
reprehensible to some in government, precedent is clear that government’s moral values may not
impede one’s expression of personal liberty. The court did set forth certain instances where
public morality arguments could withstand constitutional review though. The court specifically
mentioned laws pertaining to minors, people who can be easily coerced, people who may not
easily refuse consent, public conduct, or prostitution as potentially valid.72 Prohibiting the sale of
sex toys does not further the deterrence of any of these concerns.73 Accordingly, the 11th Circuit
Court of Appeals erroneously upheld a statute based on morals legislation. Even eliminating
public morality as a legitimate state interest warranting infringement on this type of liberty,
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003).
Id. at 578.
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governments possess an alternative strategy that can have the comparable effect of furthering
morals legislation without specifically banning certain conduct.

IV.

Secondary Effects Doctrine and Sex Toys.

States have additional methods to block the sale of sex toys without specifically
prohibiting their possession, sale or use. While only a few states actually have legislation to
make the sale of a sexual enhancement device illegal, many have utilized a twist on the public
morality argument to maintain a level of separation between the consumer of sex toys and the
vendors. Known as the secondary effects doctrine, municipalities have justified crippling
limitations on stores adult businesses (mostly adult entertainment) on the basis that these
establishments allegedly create adverse effects that are not in the interest of the public. The most
notable secondary effects are increases in crime, decreases in property values, and other
consequences that adversely impact neighborhoods.74 The secondary effects doctrine is justified
based on the rationale that governments have a substantial interest in ensuring its establishments
do not create negative secondary effects as a consequence of their existence.75 A government can
argue that a law is necessary to protect the public against such effects, providing it a substantial
amount a power to limit the operations of certain businesses.
As a result of secondary effects legislation, the true intentions of the government are
inevitably called into question. On the basis of alleged negative consequences that accompany
certain establishments, a government can impose its view of morality and regulate the sale of

74

Daniel Linz, Bryant Paul and Bradley J. Shafer, Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning
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certain items that are otherwise legal. Of course, a law cannot withstand judicial scrutiny without
some basis for contending that an adult business is causing negative secondary effects.76 Thus,
studies and statistics are often presented by a government to solidify their stance.77
City regulations that prohibit the sale of adult products can be challenged as a violation of
expressive conduct under First Amendment protections. While the First Amendment creates a
right to free speech, it is important to understand that speech encompasses something greater
than verbal communication. A right to free speech includes a freedom of expression.78 For the
purposes of this paper, the speech I argue is suppressed through anti-obscenity statutes that bar
the sale of sex toys is the freedom of sexual expression.
The Supreme Court established a test in 1968 to evaluate prohibitions on expressive
conduct. In United States v. O’Brien, the court upheld a law prohibiting destruction of draft
cards.79 The case involved an individual who burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse.80 The
man contended that his actions were an expression of his opposition to the Vietnam War.81 He
argued that by prohibiting the destruction of his draft card, the government was infringing on his
First Amendment freedom of speech.82 Conversely, the government argued that the law was
necessary to further its vital interest in creating an effective system for enlisting citizens in the
armed services during a time of war.83 In upholding the law, the court set forth a four-part test to
evaluate whether a regulation unlawfully impedes on a First Amendment freedom. The
regulation is valid if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) it furthers a
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substantial government interest, (3) if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, and (4) if the incidental restriction on the alleged freedoms is not greater than is
essential in furtherance of that interest.84 In resulting cases involving adult businesses,
governments have successfully argued that suppressing adverse secondary effects that allegedly
accompany adult businesses is a sufficient government interest to justify some level of
infringement on one’s freedom of expression.

The secondary effects doctrine dates back to 1976, in a case decided before the Supreme
Court. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the court upheld Detroit Ordinances that placed
burdensome restrictions on where adult businesses could be located within the city.85 The case
involved a theater that showed pornographic movies at two locations in Detroit.86 In 1972, the
city enacted two ordinances, one of which stated that such a theater could not be located within
500 feet of a residential area.87 The result was that the theaters were forced to less populated and
accessible areas of the city, harming the economic viability of the business. The court ultimately
opined that the ordinances did not violate the First Amendment because it did not prohibit
showing adult films; it simply dictated where the films could be shown.88 The city’s interest in
regulating the use of property is adequate to support such restraints.89 From a footnote from
Justice Stevens in this decision, the secondary effects doctrine was born. He stated:
“The Common Council’s determination was that a concentration of
adult movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus
of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other
types of films. It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances
84
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attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of ‘offensive speech.”90
Moreover, from Justice Powell’s concurrence it can be inferred that the court believed
that the ordinances fulfilled the second prong of the O’Brien test because their purpose was to
curb any deterioration of the city’s neighborhoods.91 As a result, municipalities that truly
believed that these businesses created adverse secondary effects were now armed with judicial
precedent to combat the alleged issue through zoning restrictions. Not coincidentally,
municipalities that were in favor of pushing certain moral values were also armed with a new
tool to limit the sale of adult products like sex toys.
10 years following the decision in Young, a second case was before the Supreme Court
dealing with the issue of zoning restrictions for adult businesses. In Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
the court again upheld the constitutionality of zoning ordinances that negatively impacted the
business of theatres playing adult movies.92 In this instance, the court considered the legality of a
law that made it impermissible for an adult business to operate within 1,000 feet of a residential
area, church, park or school.93 Again, the court determined that the ordinances were not enacted
to regulate the content of the movies but instead, “the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community.”94 The court further concluded that sustaining a certain quality of life
was a legitimate interest to protect.95
In 2002, the Supreme Court again considered a secondary effects case, this time relating
to a statute harmful to adult bookstores. Based on a study dating back to 1977 that linked higher
crime rates to areas containing adult entertainment establishments, the city of Las Angeles
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enacted a statute that both prohibited adult businesses from being located within 1000 feet of
each other and prohibited adult businesses from operating out of the same building.96 As a result,
two adult book stores sued the city, alleging that the new statute violated their rights under the
First Amendment.97 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals invalidated the statute, but
on different grounds.98 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals invalidated the statute because the 1977
study did not present reliable evidence by which the government could reasonably rely on to
show that the statute served the stated government interest.99 In reversing the lower court
decision, the Supreme Court determined not only that the study convincingly demonstrated a
correlation between high crime rates and adult businesses but that the city could reasonably rely
on the study to further its interest to curb criminal behavior.100 The court reiterated its holding in
Renton that a government may rely on evidence that it believes is reasonably relevant to
demonstrating a connection between speech and an independent government interest.101
Obviously, such a low requirement imposes a minimal burden on the city to justify its actions.
The court restated that the burden initially rests with the plaintiffs to cast doubt on the rationale
of the government either by establishing that the evidence presented by the city does not further
the intended government interest, or by offering evidence of its own.102 Only when the plaintiffs
cast doubt on the rationale does the burden shift to defendants.103 Here, plaintiffs did neither in
the eyes of the court and the statute was upheld.
While the Young, Renton and Alameda Books decisions suggest that adult businesses that
sell sex toys can be easily restricted by zoning laws, a few recent decisions have opened the door
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for challenges to the secondary effects doctrine. In 2000, the Supreme Court took on another
adult business case, this time concerning a law that made nude dancing illegal in a Pennsylvania
city.104 The law prohibited dancing completely nude and required that all individuals in public
wear a minimum amount of clothing.105 In City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the Court again upheld the
law.106 Justice O’Conner found that the ordinance only created a minor impediment to one’s
freedom of expression and was justified in light of the furtherance of a legitimate public interest
(combating secondary effects related to these establishments).107 The decision was not all bad for
adult businesses though as the court stated that the business “had ample opportunity to contest
the council’s findings about secondary effects before the council itself, throughout the state
proceedings, and before this Court.”108 The decision left the door open to potential challenges
regarding the sufficiency of secondary effects evidence.
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals considered a ban on the sale of alcohol at adult
businesses on the basis that the combination creates harmful secondary effects. In Flanigan’s
Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton County, the court called into question the validity of the alleged
secondary effects.109 Citing a police report performed in the county, the court noted that police
responded to more alcohol-related incidents at establishments such as bars and restaurants as
opposed to adult businesses.110 The court found that there was not enough evidence to support
the county’s secondary effects argument.111
The significance of these two cases should not be underestimated. By requiring a
showing of convincing evidence that there actually exist harmful secondary effects adult
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businesses can challenge the secondary effects doctrine. With that said, there is no indication that
there needs to be either a good deal of evidence or a limit to the type of evidence that can be
proffered. Therefore, municipalities may be able to justify regulations based on relatively low
levels of evidence. Moreover, the scope of secondary effects may be defined broadly to
encompass things like crime, property value, and aesthetics. As such, it is likely that
municipalities will be able to justify their arguments. Lastly, while requiring a showing of actual
adverse secondary effects, the courts still maintain that such evidence is a sufficient government
interest to justify these laws. Thus, adult businesses are wholly reliant on challenging the
evidence of secondary effects in order to successfully invalidate the laws.
Recently, the secondary effects evidence that governments rely upon for their zoning laws
have been called into question.112 A majority of the municipalities rely on a core group of
secondary effects studies that appear flawed.113 In Alameda Books, the court was careful to point
out that calling these studies into question.114 A government is afforded great power to
unilaterally limit businesses simply by alleging a link between the relevant business and some
associated negative effect. As such, careful attention should be paid to these studies as it has been
shown that their legitimacy can be questionable.
A recent law review article challenged the legitimacy of four secondary effects studies
that many cities rely upon to show that adult businesses produce negative effects within the
community.115 The studies were of St. Paul, Minnesota, Las Angeles, California, Phoenix,
Arizona, and Indianapolis, Indiana respectively, as focused primarily on the methodology. 116
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After careful review, there remain serious concerns as to the weight these studies should be
afforded as evidence in favor of furthering a substantial government interest.
Each analysis yielded major flaws that attack the weight of the reasonableness of
government’s reliance on these studies. The St. Paul study revealed that while there was a
connection to neighborhood deterioration and establishments that served alcohol, there was not a
connection between businesses that specialized in adult entertainment and neighborhood
deterioration.117 The Las Angeles study was plagued with skewed evidence as the researchers
either came to meekly supported conclusions or did not adhere to proper survey techniques.118
The Phoenix study claimed to show a connection between neighborhood deterioration and adult
businesses yet its control and study areas possessed vastly different income levels.119 Lastly, the
article noted the following limitations to the Indianapolis study: (1) The control sites were not
sufficiently comparable (properly matched) with the study sites, (2) No measurements were
taken prior to the establishment of an adult entertainment business to ensure that the study was
not merely picking up an already established crime pattern that is independent of the adult
businesses in the area, (3) There was a potential confounding effect caused by adult
entertainment businesses that supplied both sexually oriented entertainment and alcoholic
beverages, (4) The researchers did not adhere to minimum professional standards by failing to
conduct a survey study of real estate professionals in accordance with proper survey
techniques.120
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Time and place restrictions create a serious burden on businesses trying to operate on
equal ground. One can easily envision how such laws can impede on the viability of a business
trying to sell sex toys. Generally, businesses are treated equally as store owners are permitted to
open in commercially zoned areas, regulate their own hours, and set their own prices. Time and
place regulations generate barriers that can substantially limit an industry’s economic viability. A
rule that restricts bars from staying open past eight o’clock makes its potential for profit low.
Under such regulations, bars will be discouraged from opening, effectively eliminating drinking
establishments. Likewise, zoning restrictions on adult businesses have equally troublesome
results. Many zoning laws pertaining to adult businesses ensure that these establishments cannot
open in residential areas and areas where children are present. While these laws may have a
certain level of credibility on paper, in practice, they can effectively eliminate the sale of any
product a government wishes. For instance, consider a zoning law that prohibits the sale of
sexual devices within 200 feet of a park. Such a regulation may seem minimally intrusive, but in
actuality, it can make it nearly impossible for a business of this sort to operate. For instance, a
government intent on eliminate the sale of sex toys in a town can place a swing set on every
piece of open land it can find and put a sign up labeling it a park. The government can contend
that it is improving the aesthetics of the city, creating a family environment, and make other
seemingly worthy arguments, but in reality, it may conveniently be pushing adult businesses out
of the city.
In the cases mentioned above, the targeted establishments involved either live or video
performances of sexual nature and in some instances involved the sale of alcohol.
Moreover, the cases above generally involved cases where individuals convene for an extended
period of time. Stores that sell sex toys have arguably fewer characteristics that create
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problematic secondary effects. A store that sells adult products is hardly unlike a store that sells
kid’s toys. There is not a sale of secondary products like alcohol that inhibits one’s ability to
make good decisions, potentially leading to criminal or unruly behavior. The sale of the products
is no way physically harmful to a third party. The products can be concealed from people outside
the store by prohibiting public display of the products and requiring that upon sale of the
product, it must be placed in an opaque bag. Considering all these factors collectively, there are
at the very least serious concerns as to the validity of a secondary effects argument.

V.

Conclusion

Lawrence clearly articulated a right to sexual privacy. This right encompasses all sexual
conduct that occurs within the privacy of one’s home. While governments have attempted
prohibit the sale and distribution of sex toys, such action is impermissible. Just as prohibiting the
sale of contraceptives infringes on one’s right to sexual privacy, so does a ban on the sale of sex
toys. Unlike a commercial sale of sex like prostitution, the sale of sex toys is meant purely for
private, personal use. Lawrence makes it clear that upholding a level of public morals is not
sufficient to infringe on bedroom behavior, thus invalidating anti-sex toy statutes. Nevertheless,
governments are armed with the secondary effects doctrine that can help them effectively ban
these sales. While there may be instances where this interest in legitimate to uphold zoning laws
harmful to adult businesses, the credibility of secondary effects evidence should be seriously
questioned as this evidence is often misleading and contestable. As more individuals begin to
question the evidential grounds for this type of legislation, it has become apparent that much of
the information that has formed the basis for secondary effects legislation can be challenged.
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Oftentimes, whether secondary effects legislation is valid is often directly related to the actual
intent of the government electing to enact such laws. Furthermore, secondary effects arguments
appear to be more effective against businesses that either show pornographic material or live
nudity. Stores selling sex toys simply solicit business for goods that are used in one’s home.
Ultimately, there should be little in terms of legal barriers that make it difficult for an individual
to exercise his right to sexual privacy by purchasing a sex toy.
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